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Since 2013, a three-year entry bar (zapret na v’ezd) has been issued in Russia to 
migrants with a record of two or more administrative offences. This article 
examines the socio-legal characteristics of zapret na v’ezd by situating it in a 
global, comparative perspective, vis-à-vis the legal developments in the areas of 
deportation and removal in the United States and the United Kingdom. This paper 
argues that the Russian entry bar law experienced a shift, established by other 
migration-receiving jurisdictions, from controlling the migration process to 
controlling the social conduct of migrants, toward an increased reliance on 
deportability as a form of post-entry control of the migrant population. At a 
broader level, I aim to shed more light on the migration governance processes in 
Russia – the third largest destination of migrants worldwide – by moving away 
from the intellectually dead-end explanations that consider Russia as a deviant 
exception. 
 





Entry bar or zapret na v’ezd (запрет на въезд) is an immigration law 
sanction that came to force in Russia gradually in 2012 and 2013. Initially, a 
three-year entry bar was to be issued to anyone who had not left the territory of 
Russian Federation (RF) within the thirty-day grace period after the expiry of his 
or her residence permit. In July 2013, new, stricter amendments followed – the 
three-year entry bar was to be issued to foreign citizens who committed two or 
more administrative offences—a category that included, for example, a speeding 
or a parking ticket—within a three-year period. In practice, this new law applied 
to past offences (Gannushkina 2014). If issued from within the country, the entry 
bar rendered a person effectively deportable.
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The issuance of this form of entry bar does not result from a judicial 
decision, but lies within the discretion of a Federal Migration Service (FMS) staff 
member.
2
  In the majority of cases, an FMS officer issues zapret na v’ezd after 
cross-referencing the police databases of petty administrative (e.g., traffic) 
offences
3
 with the database that holds information about foreign citizens’ 
residence status in Russia.
4
 If two offences are registered against a foreign 
national’s name, the entry bar is issued. 
Among migration scholars and human rights lawyers in Russia, this is 
called popast’ v bazu (попасть в базу), meaning to “fall into the database,” or to 
“get caught into the database,” language that captures the lack of agency on the 
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part of the migrants against whom a bar has been issued. This language intuitively 
points to the haphazard law enforcement and a negative image of law – a 
reflection of the all too familiar traits of Russian legal culture – legal nihilism and 
cynicism about the law (Kurkchiyan 2005, 263-64) that the legal scholars 
inexorably share with the wider society. After all, tripping and falling into does 
not inspire much confidence in how the law in general is applied among citizens 
and non-citizens alike, but brings to mind the rather well-known and well-
rehearsed arguments about how the law does not really work in Russia. 
But is this the full story? How does one understand the evolution and 
enforcement of the entry bar legislation in Russia? Should it be explained solely 
from the perspective of Russia’s lack of the rule of law (Kahn 2002, 2008; 
Hendley 2006; McAulley, Ledeneva, and Barnes 2006), the country’s historical 
and political otherness (Ledeneva 2006a, 2006b, 2013), or obscure and notorious 
bureaucratic caveats (Kononenko and Moshes 2011) giving rise to massive 
abuses? Whilst I acknowledge the importance of these explanations, based on 
empirical fieldwork conducted in Russia between April and October 2014, I argue 
that the clue to understanding the entry bar legislation and enforcement in Russia 
also lies elsewhere. 
This article explains the zapret na v’ezd legislation and enforcement by 
placing it in a comparative perspective. I trace how the evolution of the entry bar 
legislation in Russia reflects the more global trends and directions of immigration 
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law in the United States and Europe (Menjívar 2014a, 2014b). Russia, with 11.6 
million foreign-born people currently residing in its territory, is the third largest 
destination for migrants worldwide (after the United States and Germany), 
attracting in particular migrants from Central Asia – Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (United Nations Population Division 2015). Situating 
zapret na v’ezd in a more global, comparative perspective clearly demonstrates 
how the evolution of the Russian immigration law follows the logic, well-
established in other major migration-receiving jurisdictions, of an increased 
reliance on deportation and deportability (de Genova and Peutz 2010) as a form 
of post-entry control of the migrant population rather than a regulatory border 
control tool (cf. Kanstroom 2000). 
Another similarity is the retroactive application of the law: entry bar in 
Russia and deportation in the United States in particular, are often issued for 
administrative or criminal offences (aggravated felonies in the United States, a 
category that since 1996 has expanded in scope almost exponentially) committed 
prior to the introduction of the law that has attached immigration consequences to 
these offences. In other words, I turn to a comparative perspective to understand 
certain legal phenomena and socio-legal processes taking place in one specific 
country, Russia, better by reference to the legal developments in the areas of 
deportation and removal in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
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At the same time, I readily acknowledge that to understand the nuances 
and subtleties of the entry bar legislation in Russia fully, one needs to see how 
these global practices and tendencies are entwined or combined with the elements 
of local legal specificity (Shevel 2012, 112), as Russia’s case comes of course 
with its particulars, which affect the translation of these practices into the local 
context. These differences concern the rather broad (in relation to other migration-
receiving jurisdictions) appeal structures. Unlike the United Kingdom, where, 
with the introduction of the Immigration Act 2014, one could observe the 
scything of appeal rights in immigration cases, the formal appeal structures in 
Russia remain rather broad – both administrative review and regular court routes 
are available for challenging the entry bar. 
The final distinction lies in the proportionality of the entry bar relative to 
the offence (administrative conviction). Russia – in contrast to the UK or the 
United States – has not formally criminalized its migration law. The violations of 
migration law are of an administrative nature and follow administrative process. 
And yet, with the introduction of the entry bar for minor administrative offences, 
such as speeding or parking tickets, the migration law appears disproportionally 
harsh, leading towards increasingly punitive administrative process aimed at non-
citizens. By contrast, deportation in the United States or the UK, however harsh 
and inflexible, is nevertheless primarily attached to a criminal conviction 
(Legomsky 2007; Chacon 2009, 2012). 
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Whilst much of the discussion on deportation in the United States and the 
United Kingdom takes place in the context of criminalization of migration 
(Aliverti 2012, Kubal 2014), overcriminalization (Chacon 2012) or – blatantly – 
“crimmigration” law (Stumpf 2006; Moore 2008; Romero 2010), the analysis of 
the entry bar in Russia invites a deeper reflection about the nature and the 
consequences of the civil/criminal labels in migration law (cf. Steiker 1997; Sarat, 
Douglas, and Umphrey 2011). I contend that although formally within the remit 
of the administrative law, if analyzed from the perspective of the impact on 
migrants’ lives, zapret na v’ezd actually constitutes a quasi-criminal sanction, a 
form of punishment. 
This article proceeds as follows. The next section presents the research 
methods I used in gathering empirical material and explains in more detail the 
comparative perspective I adopted to understand the entry bar legislation and 
immigration practice in Russia. Section 3 examines the evolution of entry bar 
legislation, followed by a presentation of an empirical case study based on a story 
of Akmal (a composite character) of how the entry bar operates in Central Asian 
migrants’ everyday lives in Moscow (Section 4). Sections 5 and 6 analyze the 
similarities between the entry bar and deportation practices in Russia and in the 
UK and the United States: the shift from employing these tools to control 
migration processes to control the post-entry conduct of migrants, and the 
increased retroactive application of immigration law, respectively. Sections 7 and 
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8 point out the differences with respect to the appeal structures, and the 
proportionality (severity) of these sanctions, in relation to the alleged 
transgressions of the law. The paper concludes with a broader discussion about 
civil/criminal labels in migration law. 
2 A NOTE ON METHODS AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
This article is based on empirical material gathered in Moscow during five 
months’ fieldwork in 2014 (between April and October). I collected the primary 
data in three different settings. First, I observed the work of a number of NGOs 
(e.g., legal aid clinics) and organizations (e.g., migrant trade unions) that help 
migrants with their legal problems and represent them in courts, in disputes with 
employers or with the FMS. I selected the different organizations to map the types 
of services (both paid and pro bono) available to migrants. Throughout several 
months, I observed the interactions between the lawyers, employees of the NGO, 
and their clients. Normally, I sat in one corner of a consultation room with my 
notebook upon being introduced to the clients of the organization as a researcher; 
sometimes I played a more active role as an interpreter or office clerk (e.g., 
photocopying materials). These daily observations, supplemented by in-depth 
interviews with a selected number of representatives of NGOs, migrant 
organizations and lawyers, informed me about (1) how migrants found out and, 
subsequently, sought specialist help about their entry bar, (2) the role the above-
 8 
 
mentioned institutions play in mediating migrants’ access to justice in Russia, and 
(3) the experiences of handling claims and complaints, their outcomes, and their 
consequences (see Appendix). 
Second, I conducted an ethnographic study in a sample of low-level courts 
in Moscow (district courts, Moscow city court, and Moscow oblast court). This 
was informative about the nature of cases when migrants or their representatives 
mobilized the law – in this specific context, by challenging the legality of the 
entry bar, appealing the grounds for the entry bar, or complaining against 
unauthorized issuance of the entry bar by the specific territorial FMS unit. The 
observations of the interactions in the courtroom gave first-hand information on 
how the entry bar cases were considered by the Russian justice system. 
Third, my regular observations at these places were supported by in-depth 
interviews with migrants themselves, sometimes in a more formal setting (e.g., 
whilst accompanying them to the FMS offices in Moscow), sometimes in less 
structured and less formal settings (e.g., at social gatherings). Drawing on these 
interviews, my article gives voice to those migrants whose lives are shaped by the 
law, capturing their experiences of learning about their re-entry bar, the intricate 
strategies of living under its shadow, and the ways in which they challenged it. 
The comparative perspective adopted in this study acknowledges the 
specificity of Russia, while avoiding the intellectual trap of treating Russia as 
exceptional or deviant. I argue that to capture the distinctive nuances and 
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subtleties of Russian immigration law requires a comparative perspective (Nelken 
2004), drawing on similarities and differences with immigration law 
developments in other migrant-receiving jurisdictions. 
This article therefore contributes to comparative socio-legal scholarship 
analyzing zapret na v’ezd in Russia by drawing inferences with deportation orders 
as developed and widespread in Western (mainly American and British) 
immigration law and practice, which although formally different, in practice share 
similar logics and modes of operation and have analogous consequences. I use 
Western as a heuristic (meaning liberal-democratic) to enable comparison with 
other main immigration receiving countries – the United States and the United 
Kingdom – and the scholarship developed there. 
The title of this paper—Entry bar as surreptitious deportation?—alludes to 
the type of comparative analogy I rely on, arguing that the entry bar could best be 
understood as a form of deportation, exclusion from legality very much 
resembling the conditions of deportability: the possibility of deportation, the 
possibility of being removed from the space of the nation-state (de Genova 2002, 
439), which constitutes a specific form of contemporary migration governance. I 
ultimately contend that this practice, despite its name of entry bar, is actually very 
much akin to deportation – albeit a silent and clandestine one. The predicament 
under which many migrants in Russia with entry bars find themselves is similar to 
that of a legal limbo: migrants are prevented from regularizing their stay, and are 
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subject to removal (deportation or expulsion proceedings) in the event of an 
immigration raid or an ad hoc control. 
3 EVOLUTION OF ENTRY BAR LEGISLATION IN RUSSIA 
Prior to 2012, the zapret na v’ezd was solely tied to extradition, 
deportation, or expulsion proceedings. Once a court determined a person to be 
eligible for deportation, that person would be physically removed from the 
territory of RF and a zapret na v’ezd would be issued for a particular period of 
time. It was an auxiliary mechanism, similar to how re-entry bars are administered 
currently in the United States or the United Kingdom. 
On December 30, 2012, Russian lawmakers decoupled the entry bar from 
the deportation/expulsion proceedings. The entry bar was made a stand-alone 
sanction issued to foreign citizens who have not left the territory of RF within the 
thirty-day period since the expiry of their residence permits (Law on the Rules of 
Entry and Exit from the Territory of the RF 2012, Article 26, Paragraph 8, 
hereafter the Law on the Rules of Entry and Exit). This first stage in the evolution 
of zapret na v’ezd was an element of Russia’s wider migration governance policy 
and practice. Two broad phenomena inspired these changes: the strategically 
pursued liberalization of the migration policy and the economic crisis that hit 
Russia severely in 2009. 
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Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, visa-free movement between the 
former Soviet Union countries has been possible. The already high level of 
migration acquired a new momentum in 2006 when the Russian government 
announced the policy of attracting new, and regularizing already-present, 
migrants. Due to unfavorable demographics, with a catastrophic decrease in life 
expectancy (plunging to 56 years for men during the early 1990s and having 
recovered now to only 62 years), Russia was in dire need of migrant labor 
(Malakhov 2014). One main change to the new policy was the simplification of 
the procedures by which migrant workers regularized their residence and 
employment (as evidenced in laws No. 109-FZ, No. 110-FZ of 2006). This 
change, combined with executive steps to make it easier for citizens of former 
Soviet republics to acquire Russian citizenship (Presidential Decree N 1545 
2004), marked a significant transition in Russia’s migration policy from 
restricting immigration to importing labor and attracting more migrants 
(Malakhov 2014; Ivahniuk 2015). 
Furthermore, until January 2014, citizens of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS)
5
 could come to Russia and stay there for a 90-day grace 
period without any special documents (except for the residence registration that 
was obligatory to all, including Russian, citizens). They could use this time to find 
work, in construction, cleaning or other services, and start sending remittances 
back to their origin countries. Prior to the expiry of the 90-day grace period, many 
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would apply for a permit in order to continue working in Russia legally. Due to 
strict quotas, however, many would not be able to obtain work permits. As a 
result, they would leave the territory of the RF, cross into Ukraine or Kazakhstan, 
for example, and return within one day with a new 90-day grace period. Their 
situation could best be described as one of semi-legality (Kubal 2009, 2013): they 
were residing in Russia in accordance with the migration law (Law on the Rules 
of Entry and Exit 1996), but accessing the labor market outside of the legal 
provisions regulating it. Those who could not afford the trips to the border every 




When the economic crisis hit Russia in 2009, the number of building sites 
and new construction projects was significantly reduced; the newspapers were full 
of pictures of sites that were abandoned by developers (Lowe 2009). Migrants 
were considered likely to respond to this situation by returning to their home 
countries. However, by that time the movements between Central Asia and Russia 
had become intrinsically linked to wider processes of social change and 
transformation in the region (cf. de Haas 2010). Not only individual families, but 
also whole communities relied on remittances sent by migrants (Buckley and 
Hofmann 2012). Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic had become two of the top 
three remittance-dependent countries worldwide – with money transfers 
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constituting 40 and 27 per cent of their respective GDPs (World Bank 2011). 
Unsurprisingly, migrants did not and could not return. 
As a consequence, the Russian state-controlled (and sponsored) 
deportations and expulsions, as traditional sanctions for non-compliance with 
immigration law, became ineffective and costly to enforce. According to the data 
published by the FMS, in the first five months of 2009 alone, Russia spent more 
than 2m RUB (66,564 USD
7
) on the deportation of just 13 people.
8
 At that time, 
GDP per capita (based on purchasing-power-parity) in Russia was 14,830 USD. It 
was difficult for the government to justify the removal cost of one person, which 
equaled over one third of GDP per capita, especially in times of economic crisis. 
A solution that would take the financial burden off the public resources needed to 
be found. 
Migration policy makers saw decoupling zapret na v’ezd from deportation, 
and thereby making it a stand-alone sanction, as a way to solve this issue. The 
introduction of zapret na v’ezd legislation in December 2012 therefore arguably 
took place in response to a growing migrant population with expired work 
permits. A person against whom zapret na v’ezd was administered was obliged to 
leave the territory of the RF within the shortest possible time, as he or she would 
be prevented from extending and renewing his or her immigration papers (a 
residence or a work permit) in Russia. 
 14 
 
And yet, understanding the first stage of the evolution of the zapret na 
v’ezd legislation solely in the context of Russian government’s response to the 
growing number of undocumented migrants from Central Asia tells only part of 
the story. Migrants with perfectly legitimate immigration documents (both in 
terms of residence and work permits) face, in Russia, haphazard law enforcement 
on the side of the different state organs, mainly police officers who are not legally 
entrusted with enforcing immigration law (Open Society Institute 2006; Reeves 
2013; Dave 2014). The enforcement of the immigration rules and practices is 
focused on disciplining and punishing migrants who fail to obey the law, rather 
than facilitating general compliance. In other words, migrants are often caught in 
the net of potential immigration fraud that is cast far too wide, with discretion 
given to law enforcement agents but not enough accountability or safeguards and 
protections for those “facing the law” (Kubal forthcoming). This demonstrates 
that the introduction of the entry bar in Russia “in response to migrant illegality” 
was in fact a response to a phenomenon constructed by the state law and its 
oppressive law enforcement. 
The second stage in the evolution of the entry bar legislation began on 
July 23, 2013, when the law was amended so that any foreign citizen who, within 
a period of three years, had committed two or more administrative offences 
received a three-year entry bar (Law on the Rules of Entry and Exit 2013, Article 
26, Paragraph 4). This amendment shifted zapret na v’ezd from immigration law 
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convictions (overstaying one’s leave to remain) to administrative law offences. As 
a result, a single traffic offence that leads to no prison time now falls within the 
reach of the new entry bar grounds. This significantly increased the possibility 
and likelihood of zapret na v’ezd: administrative offences that previously would 
have had no possible immigration law consequences now mandate surreptitious 
deportation – a three-year (re-)entry bar making it effectively impossible for a 
migrant to regularize his or her stay in Russia. This new legislation has also 
created a complicated regulatory structure with regard to past offences. Entry bars 
have been enforced ex post facto – for traffic offences that have already been 
settled in law (with the fines paid). The retroactive application of this new law 
makes de facto deportable migrants who were charged with offences that, at the 
time of conviction, would not have had any immigration law-related 
consequences. 
When the law introducing zapret na v’ezd for administrative offences 
entered into legal force, the number of people against whom re-entry bars were 
issued increased over seven-fold between 2013 and 2014, peaking at 1.7 million 
in February 2016  (see Figure 1). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 16 
 
4 CONTROLLING WHOM? AN ENTRY BAR CASE STUDY 
Russia, due to its geopolitical positioning and post-empire status, was a 
magnet for migrant workers from the region. Nearly 43 percent of all migrants in 
Russia are citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan 
(United Nations 2009). Due to the free movement, no-visa regime, they would 
have entered the country legally and, on the basis of a work permit or a patent (an 
out-of-quota work permit introduced in 2011), would have been accepted by the 
FMS as legal residents in Russia. Most migrants from Central Asia come to 
Russia to work, however some, particularly those from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, 
seek refuge from religious or political persecution. Almost all of them are legally 
eligible to become Russian citizens via the three-year temporary residence permit 
(razresheniye na vremennoe perezhivanie
9
) and subsequently indefinite leave to 





Those migrants, as legal residents, work, marry, raise children who then 
go to school, and lead lives in many aspects similar to those of Russian citizens. 
When lawful residents face charges in a court of law, the formal qualities of the 
process largely resemble those encountered by a citizen. Migrants have the same 
procedural protections and face the same system of trial and sentencing with the 
same right to appeal. According to the Russian Constitution, they cannot be 
charged with a crime that was not a crime at the time of its commitment; they 
cannot receive a sentence that exceeds that authorized at the time the crime was 
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committed. And yet, despite these procedural safeguards in place, the legal 
residents face one big difference in the legal process – with the changes in the 
entry bar legislation over 2012 and 2013, two or more simple administrative 
offences, such as parking or speeding tickets, now make them effectively 
deportable, since these offences lead to a three-year entry bar and the 
impossibility of further legalization. 
To add some empirical flesh to the statistical and legal information and 
illustrate whom the entry bar de facto affects and with what consequences, this 
section presents a case study of a composite character, Akmal.
12
 Akmal is thirty-
one, Muslim, and comes from Fergana in Uzbekistan. He arrived in Moscow 
nearly eleven years ago and initially stayed with one of his extended family 
members: an uncle. He was working for him on one of Moscow’s many 
construction sites. Now, when he drove me in his car around the city, he would be 
pointing to buildings which he helped to construct or to restore, or where he 
offered a consultation. With time, Akmal moved to work for himself. He bought a 
car and in his spare time, mostly at night, he worked as a taxi driver – mainly for 
people he knew and extended family members who were coming from Uzbekistan 
to Moscow and needed to be picked up from the airport. 
Akmal, now an experienced builder, rose through the career ranks in the 
construction industry and started working as a team leader for one of the building 
companies. That company was an example of the complex and intricate pyramid 
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of intermediaries, where, until the crisis of 2009, Akmal controlled who would be 
hired on the different construction projects, making sure to fill the available 
vacancies with the network of his kinsmen from Fergana. At one point he was 
managing a team of fifteen people on a large construction project outside of 
Moscow. Akmal and his team specialized in window and door fittings. Their 
clients were mainly other construction companies, or individuals renovating their 
flats, apartments, and houses, or building new ones. 
Akmal was able to cut back on his taxi driving. He nevertheless still very 
much relied on his car to get to work and to commute between different 
construction sites. He often was stopped by the traffic police for a regular 
document check, and was sometimes fined for speeding or not wearing a seatbelt. 
The tickets were never higher than 500 Roubles (approximately 8 USD). Akmal 
never had a serious collision; he never drove under the influence of alcohol. He 
was a careful and experienced driver. He accepted the tickets as part of the 
business, and paid them on time. 
With regard to his immigration papers and work permit, Akmal followed a 
typical pattern of a migrant worker in Russia. Initially, when he arrived in 
Moscow, he resided legally, on the basis of the free movement (no visa) regime 
between Russia and the former Soviet republics, but he worked without a permit. 
A work permit was too expensive to obtain for a first-time migrant worker in 
Moscow. Gradually, however, he legalized his work, obtained a work permit via 
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an intermediary, and renewed the permit more or less regularly. There were times 
when the money was short due to delays in getting paid, so Akmal would seek 
different means of regularizing his stay – he would leave Russia for one day, 
return and enjoy a renewed grace period of three months for arranging a new 
work permit. As Akmal became more experienced and knowledgeable about the 
migration papers market, he would omit the intermediaries and apply for a work 
permit directly at the FMS. 
In February 2014, during what he thought would be a routine renewal of 
the work permit, for the first time his application was rejected. The local FMS 
officer told Akmal that his name had been placed on a blacklist (chernyi spisok), 
and that he was forbidden entry to the RF (v’ezd zakryt). He was asked to leave 
Russia in the shortest possible time. Akmal was not given a reason why this had 
happened. With various construction projects underway, money still owed to 
Akmal and his team, a wife and a child living with him in Moscow, leaving 
Russia seemed impossible. 
Akmal wanted to find out why he had been issued the re-entry bar. This 
involved a painstaking process. There are only a few FMS offices in Moscow that 
offer such service, and they are open only twice a week and understaffed. He had 
to wake up at 4 am in order to register himself in the queue (the so-called zhyvoi 
ochered). Akmal arrived at 5 am, five hours before the office opened, and was 
already tenth in the queue. Six hours later, an FMS officer confirmed that the 
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three-year entry bar had been issued for administrative offences committed within 
the last three years. He found out the exact date of the issuance of re-entry bar, 
when the bar information had been forwarded to the border guards of the RF, and 
which local FMS office had issued it. The information also included the date 
when the re-entry bar would automatically be lifted. When asked about the exact 
nature of the administrative offences committed, the FMS officer did not have this 
information on the database, except for a general reference to the relevant 
statutory provision. He advised Akmal to contact the Federal Bailiff Service
13
 for 
detailed information. However, a quick look at the open database of the State 
Inspection of Road Safety
14
 demonstrated that Akmal had earned himself three 
tickets (two for speeding and one for not wearing a seatbelt) between 2011 and 
2013. He promptly paid the fines for two out of the three tickets. The entry bar 
would have therefore been administered partially in a retrospective manner as the 
law introducing the entry bar on the basis of two or more administrative offences 
within a time span of three years was only introduced in July 2013. 
Akmal asked the FMS officer about the possibility of removing the entry 
bar. He was told that if any of his close family members were Russian citizens, he 
could apply for the removal of the bar by writing a letter to the head FMS office 
in Moscow and submitting notary-certified copies of the marriage certificate 
and/or passport or birth certificate of the child. Akmal was fortunate that he fit the 
criteria: he was married to a Kyrgyz woman with Russian citizenship, and his son, 
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born in Moscow, was also a Russian citizen. At the time of writing this paper, 
Akmal was still waiting for the decision of the FMS in response to his letter. 
Akmal is a composite character. This case study is designed to be 
representative of many Central Asian migrants in Russia against whom an entry 
bar has been issued. Some of them, like Akmal, have family members who are 
citizens of RF, and therefore can appeal the bar on the basis of Article 8 (the right 
to private and family life) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), 
to which Russia is a party. Many of them, however, do not have this advantage 
and, upon receiving the entry bar on the basis of administrative offences, they join 
a growing group of legally produced (de Genova 2004) illegal or deportable 
people. This case study illustrates many of the important features of entry bar 
immigration law in practice. In the remainder of the paper, I focus on the four 
most important features: (1) a shift in the role of the entry bar from controlling the 
migration process to controlling the social conduct of migrants, (2) the 
retroactivity in administering the entry bar, (3) the grounds of appeal and 
structures available for challenging the entry bar, and (4) the proportionality or 
severity of the sanction, demonstrating that it falls somewhere in the grey area of 
the civil/criminal divide. 
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5 CONCEPTUALIZING THE ENTRY BAR AS A FORM OF 
SOCIAL CONTROL DEPORTATION MODEL 
Daniel Kanstroom in his seminal essay on Deportation, Social Control 
and Punishment, introduced an important distinction between two basic models of 
deportation laws and practices: border control and social control (Kanstroom 
2000, 1897). The border control model envisions deportation as “the consequence 
of a violation by a non-citizen of a condition imposed at the time of entry” (ibid, 
1898) – in other words, it sanctions deportation as a consequence of a violation of 
the contract between the migrant and the host country as inherent to the 
immigration law. The social control deportation model rests on a different 
assumption – it is conceived of as a method of continual control of the behavior of 
non-citizens for their alleged post-entry misconduct; it is normally issued by 
courts as a result of a non-citizen breaking some sort of laws on the territory of 
the host state (usually criminal in nature or attracting a relatively long 
imprisonment). In the United States, for instance, deportation follows from being 
found guilty of committing crimes classified as aggravated felonies (sanctioned 
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [AEDPA] and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act [IIRIRA], both of 1996); 
in the UK, the 2007 UK Borders Act made deportation non-discretionary when 
the jail sentence was over a year.
15
 These immigration reforms have expanded the 
class of deportable offenses and limited judges’ authority to alleviate 
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deportation’s harsh consequences. The drastic measure of deportation or removal 
is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of non-citizens convicted of crimes. 
Kanstroom (2000) argues convincingly that, in the latter sense, the 
deportation law is more analogous to criminal law and often seems more punitive 
than regulatory. By distinguishing these two types of deportation models, 
Kanstroom in fact draws a line between a regulatory/punitive and civil/criminal 
deportations. This typology, systematically denied by courts in the United States, 
which – until Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) – rather tautologically insisted that 
deportation, however harsh it may be in practice, is not a criminal sanction but a 
regulatory and administrative procedure (Schuck 1984; Golash-Boza 2010), 
therefore enables analysis into the real effects of deportation for long-term 
residents and their families. 
With the expansion of the criminal grounds leading to deportation (since 
1996) the US Supreme Court in Padilla has recognized deportation as an integral 
part of the penalty that may be imposed on non-citizen defendants who plead 
guilty to specified crimes. The deportation for lawful permanent residents “no 
longer serves the remedial purpose of regulating the immigration process, but 
seeks to punish the residents for the underlying criminal behaviour” (Ortiz 
Maddali 2011, 6). As a result, the court established that because deportation based 
upon criminal convictions is akin to punishment—“[t]he severity of deportation 
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[is] the equivalent of banishment or exile” (Padilla v. Kentucky 2010, 1486)—it 
requires special safeguards and protections. 
The acknowledgment by the US Supreme Court that deportation may 
constitute a punishment, legally recognizes Kanstroom’s typology. In the 
regulatory or border control model, the role of deportation was supposed to be 
remedial (Ortiz Maddali 2011, 34), to put an end to ongoing immigration 
violations
16
 where one’s presence on the territory of the state would constitute a 
continuing violation of immigration law. In contrast, sanctioning deportation for 
(even minor) criminal offences committed on the territory of the host state does 
not serve this purpose – the alleged crime has already been committed and the 
person would have served the sentence prescribed by law. Here, deportation is, 
according to the court in Padilla, “an integral part – and sometimes the most 
important part of the penalty that may be imposed” (Padilla v Kentucky 2010, 
1480). It serves a different, punitive function: it aims to control the behavior of 
those migrants already admitted to the country. 
The Kanstroom typology and the discussion around Padilla also casts 
more light on zapret na v’ezd in Russia. The evolution of entry bar legislation and 
practice in Russia following the changes to the Federal Law on the Rules of Entry 
and Exit in December 2012 and July 2013 reveals how the entry bar has been 
transformed from a remedy for an ongoing immigration law violation to a 
punishment for the administrative offences of migrants legally admitted and 
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legally residing in the country. This demonstrates a shift from the regulatory, 
border control model, where the entry bar sanction was indeed to control the 
immigration process, toward the social control model, resting firmly on the 
condition of deportability (de Genova 2002, 439) of a growing number of 
migrants, mostly already within the country. Thus, Russia has followed the global 
trend toward migration governance through deportability (de Genova and Peutz 
2010). 
6 LEX RETRO NON AGIT?
17
 THE RETROACTIVITY OF THE 
ENTRY BAR 
Russia has also followed in the footsteps of other immigrant-receiving 
jurisdictions in the retroactive application of its immigration law. The 2013 
amendment states that the entry bar should be administered to foreign citizens 
who “two or more times within the three years’ period were brought to 
administrative responsibility” (Law on the Rules of Entry and Exit 2013, Article 
26, Paragraph 4). This wording leaves open the exact placement of this three-year 
window. In practice, immigration officials have interpreted this language to mean 
any three-year period of a migrant’s residence rather than a three-year period 
since the passage of the law. 
The retroactive application of the law arguably conflicts with Article 54 of 
the Russian Constitution, which prohibits ex post facto punishment in criminal 
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and administrative law. However, the permissibility of retroactive laws requiring 
the de facto deportation of (long-term) lawful residents has so far not made it 
before the courts. 
Russian practice resembles that of the United States. After the passage of 
the IIRIRA and  the AEDPA of 1996, deportation became a virtually automatic 
consequence of a criminal conviction, even if the alleged crimes were committed 
prior to the passage of the Act (Kanstroom 2000, 1891). AEDPA and IIRIRA 
placed mandatory detention orders on all non-citizens convicted of crimes to be 
applied at the time of their release from the custody of the criminal justice system 
with a view to removal or deportation. The retroactivity of deportation in the 
United States rested on an assumption that the migrants “were not being punished, 
they were being regulated” (Kanstroom 2000, 1895). For example, non-citizens 
who committed crimes in the United States would first complete any jail or prison 
time that was mandated as punishment for their crimes. If those criminal 
convictions rendered them deportable, they were deported upon completing their 
sentences. 
People convicted of certain crimes classified as aggravated felonies face 
“mandatory deportation without a discretionary hearing where family and 
community ties can be considered” (United Nations Human Rights Council 
[UNHRC] 2008, 8), even though these crimes have been already settled in law. 
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Nancy Morawets illustrates the dire consequences of retroactive deportation with 
an example from her immigration law practice: 
Jackie H. immigrated to the United States at the age of 18 and has resided 
there ever since as lawful permanent resident. A few years later she was 
arrested for possession of marijuana when police discovered two ounces of 
that substance in a car that she was driving. Although she did not know 
about the marijuana, she was in fact the owner and driver of the car. 
Seeking to avoid disruption of her work and family life, she pled guilty to 
a simple possession charge and was sentenced to probation.… 
Several years later, when she applied for a replacement of her 
residency card the immigration officer picked up the conviction on a 
computer check and placed Ms. H in deportation proceedings.… Unless 
the Attorney General opts to terminate and reinitiate proceedings under 
IIRIRA, Ms. H will be deported regardless of how long ago she committed 
the offence. (Morawetz 1998, 117-18) 
The Jackie H. case demonstrates how the immigration legislation that 
sanctions deportation retroactively undermines the certainty of the law. Migrants 
could not know at the time of committing a particular crime or administrative 
offence that it would have immigration law-related consequences. Upon serving 
the sentence or having paid the fine, they would have regarded the matter as 
closed. The introduction of IIRIRA and AEDPA in the United States, when 
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applied to past convictions, served to alter the legal consequences of those 
convictions – either by creating a risk of deportation where none existed, or by 
making deportation a necessary consequence of a conviction that before only gave 
rise to a risk of deportation (Morawetz 1998, 122). 
With regard to zapret na v’ezd issued retroactively for administrative 
offences like parking or speeding tickets, during my fieldwork in Russia in 2014, 
I came across numerous cases of people who, like Akmal from the case study, 
were affected by this harsher, retroactive re-entry bar legislation. These migrants 
worked and lived in Russia in accordance with the migration law –on the basis of 
either a work permit or a patent. But then during a routine visit to the FMS office 
to renew their documents, they could be met with a staunch refusal.
18
 Due to the 
entry bar on the FMS database, their immigration papers could not be renewed 
and they were asked to leave the RF in the shortest possible time. Many felt 
confused – some of them had been working and living legally in Russia for many 
years. Now, on the basis of past speeding or parking tickets (which by and large 
they would have paid and regarded the matter as closed) they found themselves 
deportable from a country in which they had established families, lived, worked, 
and paid taxes, sometimes for many years. 
The courts in Russia have not yet taken a stance with regard to the 
constitutionality or broader legality of zapret na v’ezd issued for past 
administrative offences. Some immigration lawyers with whom I spoke in Russia 
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dismiss the potential unconstitutionality of zapret na v’ezd. One said that 
“theoretically it has not been designed as a supplementary punishment for past 
offences” (Interview 3, 2014). The entry bar, another said, should rather be 
perceived as “a limitation of one’s right to re-enter the territory of RF” (Interview 
4, 2014). This argument is based on a normative principle that the state, as a 
sovereign, should have a full right to decide who should be admitted and who 
should be prohibited entry, also on the basis of that person’s conduct on the 
Russian territory – resembling the plenary power doctrine in the United States 
(Legomsky 1984, Motomura 1990). The entry bar does not void migrants’ current 
immigration papers, it “only prevents them from renewing them, applying for an 
extension of a residence or a work permit” (Interview 4, 2014). 
The Russian immigration lawyers’ arguments about the re-entry bar for 
past administrative offences being not a punishment but a limitation of one’s right 
to re-enter Russia echo the circular arguments on the side of state authorities 
elsewhere in the Western liberal-democratic jurisdictions holding that deportation 
is not a punishment but an administrative procedure. However, from the migrants’ 
perspective, the entry bar as issued in Russia for past minor administrative 
violations nevertheless comes across as a double punishment for the same 
wrongdoing. As one frustrated migrant said, 
Look, these tickets. I paid for them. I paid them. Why now the zapret is 
added as well? (Interview 37, 2014) 
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The discussion about the retroactivity of the entry bar in Russia 
demonstrates once again that this sanction is not necessarily tied to the border or 
to the admission process, but it follows what might be termed as an eternal 
probation or perhaps an eternal guest logic (Kanstroom 2000). This suggests that 
noncitizens, including lawful residents, may be subject to a shifting, even 
retroactive regime of deportation and the government’s absolute and unqualified 
right to exclude on the basis of alleged post-entry misconduct. In Russia – in 
contrast to the United States – the state does not physically expel migrants (thus 
saving on precious resources), but removes any possibility of regularizing their 
stay. It uses a subtle mechanism of closing off the internal borders by making the 
renewal of immigration and employment documents dependent on one’s traffic 
offences record. The aim of the re-entry bar regulation is not necessarily to 
enforce the general compliance with immigration law – it is to control, police, and 
ultimately exclude those who happened to transgress those rules when they were 
not even part of the law yet. The practice of barring re-entry on the basis of past 
administrative offences literally pushes migrants outside the inner ring of legality, 
resulting in a “border at the door” phenomenon (Kubal forthcoming). It makes 
their stay illegal. 
 31 
 
7 APPEAL STRUCTURES 
The slogan repeated by the FMS officials at almost every public meeting – 
“the entry bar database does not take bribes”19 – illustrates the modern, 
technocratic style of administering this new sanction. However, it also brings to 
mind the potential miscarriages of justice that could happen due to conscious or 
unconscious human and technical errors. A leading human rights activist in 
Russia expressed this in the following terms: 
OK, so the database does not take bribes. Fine. But what if the database 
gets something wrong? What if an FMS officer clicked the wrong button? 
As the database is this impersonal machine which does not take bribes, it 
is also difficult to argue with, to appeal, to correct its potential mistakes. A 
human life is involved; migrants have families, jobs, and children in 
Russia; what if they find themselves in the database by mistake, by a 
technical error? (Interview 1, 2014) 
This raises an important question about the checks and balances inscribed 
in the enforcement of the new legislation and the modes of appealing or 
challenging the entry bar. These, in Russia, still remain rather broad. Article 46(2) 
of the Russian Constitution provides that decisions and actions (or inaction) of 
state authorities, bodies of local self-government, public associations, and 
officials may be appealed against in a court of law. Courts tend to regard as 
unconstitutional any statutory restrictions of this right (Burnham, Maggs, and 
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Danilenko 2012, 669). The FMS guidelines therefore state that the “decision on 
the re-entry bar into the territory of the Russian Federation may be reviewed in 
accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation” (Federal Migration 
Service 2014). There are two main ways of challenging the entry bar in Russia – 
administrative review and judicial review, using district- (first instance) and 
regional- (second instance) level courts as arbiters between the FMS and foreign 
citizens. 
As the case study of Akmal illustrated, a person who wishes to challenge 
the entry bar via administrative review must write a letter to the Head Office of 
the FMS explaining the reasons why the bar should be lifted, accompanied with 
documentary evidence (in originals) that would support the plea. The formal basis 
for the administrative review, as described on the FMS website (and also included 
in a correspondence between FMS and one of Moscow’s legal NGOs), are rather 
broad.
20
 They include, for example, the presence of close relatives who are 
citizens of Russia (as spouses, parents, or minor children), valid temporary or 
permanent leave to remain, a valid work permit or patent, and a need for 
emergency medical treatment or full-time study at Russian universities. These 
grounds explicitly result either from the national law or international obligations 
to which Russia is a party, such as the ECHR. FMS has 30 days to respond to the 
letter with its decision. My fieldwork demonstrates, however, that the practice of 
entry bar removals is inconsistent. Despite clear FMS policy, some grounds for 
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entry bar removal are more likely to be granted than others. For example, entry 
bar challenges on the basis of permanent residence documents or a valid work 
permit are often refused. In contrast, petitions on the basis of Article 8 of the 
ECHR have been more successful. 
If denied under administrative review, one can appeal the entry bar 
directly in a regular district court, challenging not only the decision itself, but also 
the legality of the decision taken by FMS officials (e.g., procedural violations in 
arriving at the decision) (Solomon 2004, 553). Generally, the citizens do not have 
to exhaust the remedies within the administrative hierarchy before going to court 
(Burnham, Maggs, and Danilenko 2012, 661). The scope of Russian review of 
administrative action includes a review of both the law and fact issues, as the 
courts are not obliged to accept findings of fact or conclusions of law made by 
officials or other state bodies (Burnham, Maggs, and Danilenko 2012, 672). 
As courts in Russia follow the territorial jurisdiction principle, the appeal 
must be submitted either to the court in a district where the applicant is registered 
or the district court where the FMS office that took the decision about the entry 
bar is located. Since in Moscow there are difficulties for migrants to prove their 
residence registration (Reeves 2013), appeals are usually filed in the district 
courts where the main FMS offices are based. These courts have developed an 
expertise in migration-law related cases. Filing the case to court usually suspends 
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the implementation of the challenged action or decision whilst the case is pending 
(Burnham, Maggs, and Danilenko 2012, 672). 
There is also a right to appeal from the decision of the first-level district 
courts. The appeal must be lodged within seven days of the day the court 
judgment is rendered. The filing of an appeal automatically suspends execution of 
the court’s judgment or ruling. The appellate (regional) court can uphold the 
judgment, annul the judgment and return the case for further investigation, annul 
the judgment and terminate the case, or modify the judgment (Smith 1996, 146). 
The rather broad formal appeal structures in Russia contrast with the more 
limited appeal rights that have become the main feature of immigration law in 
Western liberal jurisdictions. In the Immigration Act 2014, for example (which 
repealed the Immigration Act 1999), the UK reduced the number of grounds for 
appeal from seventeen to just three (Sayeed 2014). There is only a right of appeal 
against a decision of the Home Office to refuse a protection or human rights 
claim, or against a decision of the Home Office to revoke a protection status. 
Every other immigration decision made by the Home Office will not attract a 
right of appeal, with the remedy in those circumstances being administrative 
review and/or judicial review (Sayeed 2014).
21
 Furthermore, the Immigration Act 
2014 enables the Secretary of State to require any appeal against deportation to be 
brought only after the very act of physically removing a person from the territory, 
both in UK law and EU law cases (Yeo 2014).
22
 Analogically, any person with no 
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leave to remain (and who is required to have it) may simply be removed from the 
United Kingdom with no further notice or legal step being required. The new 
provision should be seen as a simple power to remove rather than a type or 
species of immigration decision (Hoshi 2014).
23
 
With regard to the appeal structures for the entry bar, Russia’s relatively 
broad rights of appeal distinguish it (for now) from other immigration-receiving 
jurisdictions. Although there is a variation in how the formal appeal rights work in 
practice, the interviews with immigration lawyers in Russia demonstrate that they 
are definitely relied upon. As one stated: 
You do go to court. You do appeal. Whether you succeed or not … mostly 
you do not … is another matter, but as a principle you do appeal to court. 
(Interview 13, 2014) 
8 PROPORTIONALITY OF PUNISHMENT 
Notwithstanding the broad appeal structures, the introduction of the three-
year entry bar in response to alleged migrant illegality in the areas of traffic or 
other administrative offences raises rather serious questions concerning the 
proportionality of these sanctions in relation to the violations for which they are 
usually administered. I conceptualize proportionality in a socio-legal, empirical 
manner – by focusing on the disruptive effects this bar has on immigrants’ 
livelihoods. If the entry bar is often administered whilst a person resides in the 
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country (e.g., with a valid residence permit and/or a work permit), works there, 
and has children and family ties – as illustrated by the composite story of Akmal 
in the paper – the entry bar makes it impossible for that person further to renew 
his or her immigration documents and forces him or her to leave Russia for a 
period of three years. It, therefore, results in a disproportionate sanction in a 
common-sense meaning of the word. These specificities of the zapret na v’ezd 
concerning the proportionality of this practice demonstrate how global migration 
governance practices reflect the strictness and punitiveness that are long-standing 
elements of Russian legal tradition. 
The various legal reforms in Russian criminal and civil law since the 
1960s were aimed at dismantling, at least partially, the draconian elements of the 
Stalinist system (Smith 1996, 141). A set of incremental changes in the 1960s and 
1970s under the auspices of Soviet legality were designed to guarantee the 
procedural and substantive rights of citizens and to ensure the professionalism of 
the courts (ibid.). And yet, whilst the same judicial system was capable of 
professional and fair handling of routine cases (Smith 1996, 142; Hendley 2011), 
it was also used as a repressive and arbitrary tool to punish individuals in order to 
protect the state. With the changes of the perestroika period and the greater legal 
reforms that followed – e.g., introducing the new Criminal Code (1997) that 
formally decriminalized a number of victimless offences, ameliorated the severity 
of sanctions, and articulated preference for non-custodial sentences – came, 
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however, the chaos of the 1990s, preserved in collective social memory as the 
breakdown of public order and a rapid increase of violent crimes. 
The early 1990s were characterized by soaring rates of murder (Izvestiya, 
October 2, 1992, quoted in Smith 1996, 154) and rape (New York Times, January 
3, 1994, quoted in Smith 1996, 154), as well as an explosion of white-collar and 
property crimes. It is perhaps not surprising, then, in a period characterized by 
“extremist politics, volatile economics and bewildering legislation” (Kurkchiyan 
2003, 26), the Russian legal system retained strong punitive elements. These 
“stubborn legacies” of the Soviet past – the “punitive mindset” and an inclination 
to seek solutions to societal problems in repressive measures (Pomorski 1998, 
392) – were thereby preserved well into the twenty-first century. 
Russian immigration law, in contrast to the British (Aliverti 2012) or the 
American system (Chacon 2009; Romero 2010) has not been formally 
criminalized. The three-year entry bar or surreptitious deportation does seem to 
follow the logic of the social control deportation model (Kanstroom 2000), but it 
does not constitute a migration-related mechanism of enforcing criminal law 
(Legomsky 2007). It remains attached to administrative offences. Examining 
Russia’s legal tradition helps to explain this phenomenon: there was no need to 
criminalize Russian immigration law, as its repressive functions could be equally 
accommodated within the existing framework of historically punitive 
administrative law. Although formally within the ambit of the administrative law, 
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if analyzed from the perspective of the severe impact on migrants’ lives, zapret na 
v’ezd actually constitutes a quasi-criminal sanction, a form of punishment. 
The analysis of the entry bar in Russia invites a deeper reflection about the 
nature and the consequences of the civil and criminal labels in immigration law 
more broadly. With the expansion of punitive administrative sanctions, the 
division of legal sanctions into these two categories is perhaps misleading. As 
punishment seems no longer to be the distinctive attribute of criminal law (Ortiz 
Maddali 2011, 8), keeping in mind that the civil sanctions might actually be 
severer and harsher than actual criminal sanction imposed – helps to interrogate 
the actual aims of the ever-expanding criminalization of migration law in the 
United States and the UK. 
The incorporation of criminal law into the immigration domain in Western 
liberal jurisdictions can rather be viewed as an instance of symbolic law (Aliverti 
2012). These policies aim to placate public concerns with undocumented 
immigration, sending a loud and clear political message that action is being taken 
(Aliverti 2012; Kubal 2014). I argue elsewhere that even when the criminalization 
of migration is stripped of the attributes of formal judicial power, courts, and 
lawyers, it nevertheless exercises a real power over peoples’ lives. Indeed, extra-
legal manifestations of criminalization may be even more “effective” tools of 
social control (Kubal 2014, 3). Once the message of criminalization of certain 
aspects of migration law reaches the public discourse, it gains a life of its own, 
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with factors such as penal politics, media coverage, and the extensive discretion 
exercised by criminal justice and immigration officials, effectively blurring the 
boundaries between undocumented migrant, asylum seeker, and the criminal. In 
Russia the blurring or destabilization of the criminal-civil distinction is partially 
explained by its historically punitive law, partially by the current hybridization of 
legal institutions and practices and “the slipperiness of the operations of state 
power as they seek to name the various modalities of its exercise” (Sarat, 
Douglas, and Umphrey 2011, 14). This complex relationship between historical 
legacy and institutional change lies at the roots of the current instability of the 
criminal-civil distinction in all of its messy manifestations in immigration law and 
practice (cf. Steiker 1997). 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper was to examine the evolution and the socio-legal 
characteristics of the entry bar legislation in Russia, with reference to the legal 
developments in the areas of deportation and removal in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. I adopted a comparative perspective to cast more light on the 
migration governance processes in Russia and to move away from the 
intellectually dead-end explanations that exoticize Russia and invoke arguments 
about how law does not really work there. The comparative perspective 
demonstrates that the entry bar legislation follows a similar logic to the 
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developments surrounding deportation and removal orders of the United States 
and the UK: a shift from remedial to increasingly punitive sanctions, from putting 
an end to an ongoing immigration law violation to punishing migrants for their 
post-entry misconduct. Both sanctions are also increasingly retroactively applied. 
This analysis reveals how the most recent changes in Russian migration law stay 
very much in tune with more global migration governance developments. 
Where Russia diverges from the more general trends is in its still quite 
broad appeal structures in comparison to the removal of appeal rights for migrants 
in Western liberal jurisdictions. The disproportionality of the entry bar in relation 
to the actual offences for which it is administered demonstrates, however, that the 
global developments are very much combined in Russia with the local legal 
specificities and the legacy of its punitive and repressive legal system. This, in 
turn, helps to question the criminal/civil labels in migration law more broadly – 
suggesting, in particular, the danger of extending criminal liability to what are 
essentially regulatory violations. With the increased criminalization of migration 
law in the United States and the UK, this comparative analysis suggests that 
serious deterrent sanctions can effectively be imposed under an administrative 
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Entry bars issued in Russia to foreign nationals between 2009 and 2016 
 
FIGURE 1. 
Entry Bars Issued in Russia to Foreign Nationals between 2009 and 2016. 
Sources: Federal Migration Service 2009-2016, as of 2016 (when the FMS has 
been disbanded) the statistical data can be accessed from the General 
Administration for Migration Issues of the Interior Ministry of Russia, Statistical 
Department, 
https://гувм.мвд.рф/about/activity/stats/Statistics/Statisticheskie_svedenija_po_m
igracionno (all data accessed on September, 20, 2016); 2016* – cumulative data 




















2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016*




Informant details  Date Place  
1 – Head of NGO May 25, 2014 Moscow 
2 – Professional Advocate June 6, 2014 Moscow 
3 – Professional Advocate April 13, 2014 Moscow 
4 – Professional Advocate September 9, 2014 Moscow 
5 – Migration Researcher April 6, 2014 Moscow 
6 – Legal Consultant April 26, 2014 Moscow 
7 – Professional Lawyer for Migrants April 1, 2014 Moscow 
8 – Labor Rights Researcher May 16, 2014 Moscow 
9 – Migrants’ Rights Researcher June 26, 2015 Moscow 
10 – Legal Consultant May 15, 2015 Moscow 
11 – Professional Advocate April 5, 2014 Moscow 
12 – Professional Advocate April 14, 2014 Moscow 
13 – Professional Advocate September 7, 2014 Moscow 
14 – HR Lawyer April 16, 2014 Moscow 
15 – HR Lawyer April 28, 2014 Moscow 
16 – Professional Advocate June 18, 2015 London 
17 – Social Worker April 23, 2014 Moscow 
18 – Social Worker May 28, 2014 Moscow 
19 – Social Worker May 27, 2014 Moscow 
20 – Social Worker June 18, 2014 Moscow 
21 – Social Worker June 7, 2014 Moscow 
22 – Researcher September 12, 2014 Moscow 
23 – FMS Representative September 16, 2014 Moscow 
24 – FMS Representative September 18, 2014 Moscow 
25 – FMS Representative May 6, 2014 Moscow 
26 – FMS Representative June 2, 2014 Moscow 
27 – FMS Representative September 8, 2014 Moscow 
29 – FMS Representative September 19, 2014 Moscow 
30 – NGO Employee May 25, 2014 Moscow 
31 – NGO Employee September 5, 2014 Moscow 
32 – NGO Employee June 6, 2014 Moscow 
33 – Migrant Uzbekistan, male April 6, 2014 Moscow 
34 – Migrant Kyrgyzstan, female April 12, 2014 Moscow 
35 – Migrant Kyrgyzstan, male April 13, 2014 Moscow 
35 – Migrant Kyrgyzstan, female April 15, 2014 Moscow 
36 – Migrant Kyrgyzstan, female May 15, 2014 Moscow 
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Informant details  Date Place  
37 – Migrant Uzbekistan, male April 17, 2014 Moscow 
38 – Migrant Uzbekistan, male April 17, 2014 Moscow 
39 – Migrant Uzbekistan, male April 17, 2014 Moscow 
40 – Asylum Seeker Uzbekistan, male June 26, 2014 Moscow 
41 – Asylum Seeker Uzbekistan, male May 24, 2014 Moscow 
42 – Asylum Seeker Uzbekistan, male June 19, 2014 Moscow 
43 – Asylum Seeker Uzbekistan, male September 23, 2014 Moscow 
44 – Asylum Seeker Uzbekistan, female September 23, 2014 Moscow 
45 – Asylum Seeker Tajikistan, female September 20, 2014 Moscow 
46 – Asylum Seeker Uzbekistan, female June 2, 2014 Moscow 
47 – Refugee Uzbekistan, male September 18, 2014 Moscow 
48 – Refugee Uzbekistan, male September 20, 2014 Moscow 
49 – Refugee Tajikistan, male September 23, 2014 Moscow 






                                                 
1
 According to Law on the Rules of Entry and Exit from the Territory of RF 
(1996) an entry bar can be issued for two categories of offences: not possessing a 
valid residence registration or working without a valid work permit (Article 27) or 
petty administrative offences (Article 26). This article focuses on the second 
category. 
2
 In principle the entry bar can be issued by a number of Russian state institutions 
(aside from the Federal Migration Service): the Ministry Internal Affairs, Federal 
Security Service, Ministry of Defence, Russian Financial Monitoring, External 
Intelligence Service, Ministry of Justice, Drug Control Federal Service, Federal 
Service on Surveillance for Consumer Rights protection and Human Well Being, 
and Federal Medical Agency. I am grateful to Malika Bahovadinova for pointing 
this out. It is important mention that after the article has been accepted for 
publication the Federal Migration Service (FMS) has been disbanded by the 
Presidential Decree of April 5, 2016 No. 156. The functions of the FMS have 
been transferred to the Main Directorate for Migration Affairs of the Russian 
Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs. This major institutional change does not 
significantly affect the conclusions of this paper.  
3
 e.g., Central database of the state inspection of road safety: ЦБД ГИБДД – 
Центральный банк данных Государственней инспекци безопасности 
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дорожного движения. This database holds information about traffic offences 
committed by citizens and non-citizens of Russia. 
4
 Central database of the registration of foreign citizens: ЦБДУИГ –
Центральный банк данных по учету иностранных граждан и лиц без 
гражданства, временно пребывающих и временно или постоянно 
проживающих в Российской Федерации. This database holds information about 
foreign nationals residing (temporarily or permanently) in Russia. 
5
 Formed in 1991, the CIS consists of twelve of the former republics of the Soviet 
Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). 
6
 Since January 1, 2015 there has been a significant overhaul of Russia’s 
immigration law regulating the access of foreign citizens from the former CIS 
states to the labor market. The old dual work permit and patent system (work 
permits regulate employment for business establishments, while patents regulate 
employment for private persons) has been replaced by a unified patent-only 
system. For a comprehensive analysis of these new legal arrangements, see Dave 
(2014). The consequences of these changes for entry bar issuance and 
enforcement are yet to be seen. 
7
 At the exchange rate on May 25, 2009 of 0.032 USD for 1 RUB, www.xe.com. 
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8
 Statistical data on the activity of FMS field offices for the first five months of 
2009 (Статистические данные по форме 1-РД «Результаты деятельности 
территориальных органов за 5 месяцев 2009 года»): 
http://www.fms.gov.ru/about/ofstat/stat_1_rd/part_2.php (accessed August 14, 
2014). 
9
 In Russian: разрешение на временное проживание (РВП). 
10
 In Russian: вид на жительство (ВнЖ). 
11
 The new simplified Citizenship Law of 2014 (Закон об упрощении 
гражданства РФ 2014) makes special provisions for those fluent in Russian 
language, and those who were born, or whose ancestors were born and lived in the 
Russian Empire or the Soviet Union within the state borders of the RF. It has to be 
stressed, however, that while on the books, the policy changes appear very liberal: 
in practice, it is very difficult for citizens of some Central Asian states, 
particularly Uzbekistan, to obtain the citizenship of the RF. 
12
 Akmal is a composite character; I weaved his narrative from a number of 
recurring themes and experiences and the richness of detail appearing within my 
interviewees’ personal life stories, whom I met in the course of my fieldwork in 
Moscow through friends, immigration lawyers and other migrants. Therefore, 
whilst the overall figure of Akmal was intentionally composed in order to explain 
the experiences of the entry bar in an intelligible and fairly linear fashion, each 
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and every experience discussed using this case study has happened in real life. 
However, for the purposes of anonymity and individual protection, Akmal should 
be treated as a fictional character. 
13
 In Russian: Федеральная служба судебных приставов. This is a federal 
executive body primarily responsible for security in courts of law and the 
enforcement of court rulings. 
14
 In Russian: ЦБД ГИБДД – Государственная инспекция безопасности 
дорожного движения. 
15
 Before these reforms, deportation was attached to a more limited catalogue of 
offences. 
16 “Deportation is necessary in order to bring to an end an ongoing violation of 
United States law” (Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Commission 
1999, 491). 
17
 This Latin sentence translates to English as “A law does not apply 
retroactively.” 
18
 “The FMS of RF has reasons not to allow your entry into the Russian 
Federation” [In Russian: У ФМС России имеются/не имеются основания для 
неразрешения въезда на территорию Российской Федерации]. This is a 
statement that appears on FMS website, where migrants can enter their passport 
details and find out whether or not they have an entry bar. 
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19
 “Baza ne beret vzyatok” [База не берет взяток]. The reference to the non-
corruptibility of the FMS database should be put in context for those readers 
unfamiliar with Russia, where the general ability to buy one’s way out of any 
problem is often assumed. 
20
 Two letters, from August 19, 2014 by FMS Russia and from December 26, 
2014 by FMS Moscow Oblast are in the author’s archive. 
21
 In the UK, judicial reviews are distinct from appeals, in that an appeal is 
usually brought to challenge the outcome of a particular case. The judicial review 
process, on the other hand, analyses the way in which public bodies reached their 
decision in order to decide whether or not that decision was lawful. See Courts 
and Tribunals Judiciary, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/you-and-the-
judiciary/judicial-review/. In that sense the review of the entry bar decision by the 
Russian administrative justice system is broader. 
22
 However as with “manifestly unfounded,” “clearly unfounded,” various “safe 
third country,” and other types of appeal-limiting certificates, a judicial review of 
the decision to impose a certificate is possible. This will usually have the effect of 
suspending removal. Cf. Yeo (2014). 
23
 Although any intimation that the power is going to be exercised would 
demonstrate that a decision has been made in the public law sense, and that 
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decision could, theoretically, be challenged by way of judicial review. Cf. Hoshi 
(2014). 
